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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Defendant-Appellant

did not agree to the child

support order or waive his right to contest the child support order
s contended by the Respondent.
2.

There is no clear uncontroverted evidence capable of

supporting the arbitrarily low child support amount in light of the
fact that the court did not enter Findings which support the child
support amount.
3.

A party who chooses to appear Pro Se, should be held to

the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member
of the Bar.
4. The Respondent has failed to show any legal basis for the
court order requiring the child support to be paid into a trust
account.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT AGREE TO THE
CHILD SUPPORT ORDER OR WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
CONTEST THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER.
The Respondent misquotes the record in this case by contending
that Mr. Allred approved of the Court's award of $100.00 per month
in child support payments. At page 9 of the Brief, the Respondent
has quoted out of context from the Transcript of the December 21,
1988, hearing, claiming that Mr. Allred "agree" with the token
amount of support.
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A review of that hearing and the full transcript will reflect
that Mr. Allred consistently contended that child support should
be applied based upon the guide lines and never stipulated or
agreed that the child support should be $100.00 per month.

The

record states that after both parties had made their arguments,
the Court indicated its ruling, commencing at page 33 of the
Transcript.

The discussion then moved on to the off-sets which

would be made because of prior orders and judgments and credits in
relation to support for other children.

Mr. and Mrs. Allred

discussed with the judge as to when the child support of $100.00
a month should commence in light of those credits. When Mr. Allred
made the statement "perfect" (Transcript, page 36, line 12) he was
referring to the court's order to take account for the credits and
not the level of $100.00 a month as child support.
The legal argument made by the Respondent that the Appellant
agreed in some manner with the trial court is not supported by the
record.

The reliance of one word taken out of context by the

Responden evidences the lack of a legal or factual basis to support
the order of the trial court.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO CLEAR INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE
CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE ARBITRARILY LOW
CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT.
The decision of Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah Appeals,
1989) requires the court to make sufficient findings of fact to
support an award of child support.
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As set forth in the Brief of

the Appellant, the Findings of Fact in this case do not support the
minimal child support of $100•00.

Instead, the findings indicated

that the Court abused its discretionary powers in setting the
amount of support.

With proper findings, this court could defer

to the trial court's setting of the level of child support lower
than the guide line amount.

Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909

(Utah App. 1988). However, there is not findings which support the
amount set by the court in this matter and in light of the lack of
those findings, this court should find that the trial court abused
its discretion in disregarding the child support guide lines and
other evidence presented at the trial.
In the recent case of Jense v. Jense, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 46
(Ct. App. 1989), the court held that the clear weight of the
evidence was against the findings and order of the trial court.
The

court

overturned

stated

that an order modifying

a decree will be

if the evidence clearly preponderates

against the

findings or the court abused its discretion citing Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985).

The order in this case is not

even supported by sufficient findings and should be overturned as
a clear abuse of discretion.
The trial

court had

clear instructions

from past legal

precedent to enter sufficient findings of fact detailing the basis
for the award.

Since those findings of fact and conclusions were

never entered, this court should determine that the amount of child
support constituted an abuse of discretion and should reverse the
order for an entry an amount of child support consistent with
3

findings of fact and conclusions of law.
POINT III.
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, A PARTY WHO CHOSE TO
REPRESENT HERSELF, SHOULD BE HELD TO THE SAME
STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE AS ANY
QUALIFIED MEMBER OF THE BAR.
The Respondent contends that the procedural defects which took
place in this case should be ignored because the Respondent was a
layman acting as her own attorney.

The Supreme Court in the case

of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 69 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), cited by the
respondent, clearly states that a lay person, if they elect to
proceed as their own attorney, will be held to the same standard
of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the Bar. That
decisions indicates that the court should allow to lay persons
without technical knowledge consideration in the presentation of
the case.

However, the Nelson v. Jacobsen case states that

reasonable consideration does not require the court to explain
legal

rules

or

otherwise

attempt

to

redress

the

ongoing

consequences of the party's decision to function in the capacity
for which he was not trained.
In this case the Respondent attempted to use the procedural
vehicle

of

an

untimely

objection

to

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law to modify a previous order of the court. The
cases throughout the United States are consistent that a litigant
who presents his own case and acts as his own attorney is bound by
the same rules in relation to procedure and orders as members of
the Bar.

Loomis v. Seelv, 677 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1983)
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State

v, Harrold, 750 P.2d 959 (Id. App. 1988) and Newsome v. Farer, 708
P.2d 327 (N.M. 1985)
The exhibits which the Respondent has attached to her brief
support the rule requiring Pro Se litigants to follow the rules of
procedure.

The Respondent bombarded the court with hand written

letters not in correct procedural form and containing irrelevant
information intended only to prejudice the court against the
Defendant-Appellant*
that

Pro

Se

The Respondent is asking this court to rule

litigants

may

ignore

the

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and write ex parte,
irrelevant letters to the court. Granting such a drastic privilege
to persons who act as their own attorneys, will create two sets of
procedural rules, one for attorneys, another for Pro Se litigants.
POINT IV.
THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY LEGAL
BASIS FOR WHICH THE COURT ORDER REQUIRING THE
CHILD SUPPORT TO BE PAID INTO A TRUST ACCOUNT
CAN BE BASED.
As acknowledged by the Respondent, the court clearly stated
on the record at the December 21st hearing that the $100.00 per
month child support was to be required for Cory only until Cory
reached his 18th birthday.
Transcript).

(See page 9 of the Respondent's

However, in an attempt to justify the unique ruling

to pay child support into trust and not to be used for the
immediate needs of the child, the Respondent has been forced to
argue that this order can be supported by this court finding that
the court intended that the child support be paid past age 18. (See
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page 20 of Respondent's Brief). The Respondent's theory to support
the ruling is inconsistent with the statements of the Court from
the bench.
The Respondent fails to describe any statute or rule which
allows the court to create an estate for the child's benefit and
to disallow child support to the custodial parent.

There is not

basis under law to justify the trial court's untimely granting of
the Respondent's "request" to avoid child support payments and
create a trust as the recipient of the child support.

CONCLUSION OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Trial court did not enter adequate findings justifying
either the Order setting the support or the order transferring the
support to the adult child by means of the trust.

The Court also

lacked jurisdiction and did not have any available procedure to
amend the order on the basis of the Plaintiff's untimely "request".
Therefore, this court should reverse the order entered May 5,
1989, which finally adopted the amendment made by interlineation
at the hearing made on March 10, 1989, allowing the payment of
child support into a trust fund and setting child support at
$100.00 per month. The Court should then remand the matter to the
trial Court to enter child support consistent with the child
support guidelines. This Court should instruct the lower court not
to permit diversion of the child support to a trust fund rather
than paying the support directly to the appellant for current
support of the minor child.
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Respectfully submitted,

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

PROOF OF SERVICE
Counsel of the Defendant-Appellant hereby certifies that four
copies

of

this

brief

were

served

upon

the Counsel

for the

Plaintiff-Respondent, Vicki Rinne by mailing the copies to the
address on file with the Court of 9963 North Meadow Lane, Highland,
Utah 84003 on this
DATED this

day of January, 1990.
day of January, 1990.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

7

